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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for injuries to property arising 
from faulty or defective sewer lines on plaintiff's 
property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A default judgment was entered against the defendant. 
The defendant subsequently filed a motion to set aside 
the judgment. From a denial of this motion by the district 
court, defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the denial of the Motion 
to Set Aside Default Judgment, and an Order permitting a 
trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, the City of Tooele (hereafter City), 
is a municipal coq:ioration organized and existing under the 
laws of the State of Utah. The plaintiff, Shiela F. Brande 
!hereafter Brande), is a resident thereof. 
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On or about June 3, 1975, Brande informed the City 
that her property was experiencing a sewer back-up, 
apparently caused by an obstruction in the sewer lateral. 
The City flushed the main sewer line near Brande's pro;ien 
for the purpose of clearing any obstructions, but the 
line was running freely. Subsequently, the City agai~ 
flushed the lines and found them to be free of obstructio:.;. 
It concluded that the blockage must exist in the service 
lateral from the main line to the Brande residence. Althous' 
the City made numerous efforts to locate this service 
lateral, its agents could not locate it. 
Brande then employed a private contractor to exca~~ 
around the perimeter of the property until the lateral was 
located. By tracing it to the main line, the contractor 
discovered a break in the lateral on plaintiff's property 
several feet prior to the point where it connected to t~ 
City main. Plaintiff remedied the damage at this time. 
On January 24, 1977, the Tooele City Mayor was sen~ 
with a summons and complaint in this cause of action. Thes: 
items were forwarded to the City Attorney for review. 
By some mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. 
these documents were filed with investigatory materials in 
a city file, rather than being mailed to the City's insura::· 
carrier. No answer was immediately filed by the City beci;; 
of this oversight, and the problem was not apparent untii 
i Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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March 4, 1977, when the City Attorney first received 
notice that on February 17, 1977, Brande had taken a 
def"!ult judgment against the City. 
The default order was taken only 23 days after the 
date of service of the complaint, with no prior notice 
of tile action having been given to the City, either orally 
or in writing, and no notice having been given to the 
insurance carrier handling plaintiff's claim against the 
City. 
On March 17, 1977, the City filed a motion to set 
aside the default judgment, only thirteen days after re-
ceiving notice of the court clerk's entry of the default 
judgment. From denial of this mot~on, defendant brought 
this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BY FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT WHERE THE CIRCU:.ISTANCES DID NOT 
SUPPORT THE AVOIDANCE OF TRIAL ON A LEGAL 
TECHNICALITY. 
The failure of the City to file an answer within the 
statutory twenty-day period after service of summons re-
sul ted from mere mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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and not from an intentional wrongdoing. According to 
the affidavit filed in support of the Motion to Set Aside 
Default, when the mayor of the City received a copy of the 
summons and the complaint he forwarded them to the City 
Attorney for his inspection. The documents were then to 
be sent on to the City's liability carrier so that the 
carrier's attorneys could prepare and file an answer in 
behalf of the City. Due to a clerical or filing error w 
some other inadvertence, the i terns were instead placed with : 
investigatory materi~ls in a city file. This mistake d~ 
not become apparent until after the default judgment was 
entered because the plaintiff did not contact the defendant 
concerning the lack of an answer on file. Without giving 
notice of any kind, the plaintiff immediately moved for 
default judgment within a matter of days after the statutor' 
period had passed. Had defendant been aware of the error, 
an answer could have been routinely filed within the period 
specified on the summons. 
Based upon these facts, it is evident that neither t~ 
City nor its agents intentionally took any action to impede 
the progress of the law suit, to hinder the fair and irnpar:: 
trial of the case on the merits, or to commit any other wr::c 
going. The record is devoid of any fact or circumstance 
which justified the harsh position taken by the lower cou!'. 
in refusing to vacate the default judgment. 
l Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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By not allowing the trial to proceed on its merits, 
the district court failed to follow the guidelines set 
forth in numerous prior cases. This Supreme Court has 
consistently advised the lower courts to exercise caution 
in ordering default judgments. f.lc-"e::.;: v . .'fountain View 
·.;~"::Jp{,17. Es~2tes, 17 Utah 2d 323, 411 P. 2d 129 (1966). 
They are not favored because they constitute a denial of 
the litigant's opportunity to have a full and complete 
hearing on the merits of the cause, contrary to fundamental 
principles of our judicial process. In this respect, their 
effect is adverse to the interests of justice and fair 
play. Heathman v. Fabian and Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60, 
377 P. 2d 189 (1962). For this reason, the reported cases 
have quite uniformly regarded' as an abuse of discretion a 
refusal to vacate a default judgment where there is reason-
able justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to 
act and timely application is made by the party in default 
to set the judgment aside. Centr>:1Z Finance Co. v. Kynaston, 
22 Utah 2d 284, 452 P. 2d 316 (1969). The district courts 
must be indulgent toward pennitting full inquiry and know-
ledge of disputes so they can be settled advisably and in 
conformity with law and justice. The "harsh and oppressive" 
remedy of a default judgment should not be arbitrarily im-
posed. Mayhew v. Standar>d Gilsow~te Col"'lpany, 14 Utah 2d 52, 
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376 P. 2d 951 (1962). 
By failing to follow these guidelines, the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the 
defendant to defend the claim in open court. The court's 
highly technical ai:iplication of Rule 55 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure does not advan,~e the interests of 
justice or fair play and should not be condoned. 
The real function of judgment by default is to clear 
court calendars of cases where either litigant has indicate:, 
disinterest in the process or outcome of adjudication. In 
justification of admission of service requirements, this 
Court stated, in Locke v. ne, :I'S"., 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P. :: 
1111 (1955) at 1112: 
"It is undoubtedly true that this require-
ment is purposed to safeguard against enter-
ing the default of persons except where it 
satisfactorily appears that they have con-
sented thereto." 
The defendant herein has never in any way consented to defi .. 
judgment being entered against itself and in fact has strer: 
ously objected to it ab initio. Yet the plaintiff insists 
on her "right" to the default judgment over the defendant's 
objections. Since the requirement for service is intended: 
prevent unintentional defaults, the allowance of 20 days 
for an answer must also be so intended. Yet both provisic:' 
are fictions in this regard. A mere admission of service 
and the passage of twenty days without an answer does ~t 
1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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establish the defendant's consent to judgment against him-
self. The 20-day period is merely an arbitrary limit beyond 
which the defendant must be prepared to give a reasonable 
account for his delay. The defendant herein is so prepared. 
To enforce the 20-day limit here, in the face of lack 
of notice of the !lotion for Default Judgment and of defendant's 
intense diligence upon discovery of the error, would indeed 
be a "harsh and oppressive" result. The 20-day limit is 
concededly also intended to bring litigation to a speedy 
conclusion. Nevertheless, justice sure, if not so swift, 
must certainly be preferred over justice swift, but not so 
sure. To bind the defendant's entire defense on the merits 
to its initial, unintentional and unperceived failure to 
respond on time would be purely arbitrary. 
Certainly, the delay involved here is dubiously small, 
at most. In Lock v. Peterson, su,~l'a, at 1113, this court 
pointed to its "declared policy that in case of uncertainty, 
default judgments should be set aside to allow trial on 
the merits." This court first most fully expressed that 
~licy in the analogous case, Utah Commercial and Savings 
E1nk v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198, 53 P. 1033 (1898), at 1036 
where it stated: 
"The power of the court to set aside judgments 
by default is recognized and conferred in 
section 3005, Rev. St. 1898, and should be 
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liberally exercised, for the purpose of 
directing proceedings and trying causes 
upon their substantial Merits; and where 
the circumstances which led to the default 
are such as to cause the court to hesitate 
it is better to resolve the doubt in favor' 
of the application, so that a trial may be 
secured on the merits." 
Thus, it is clear that the "liberal" doctrine in questior.-
able cases is long-established in Utah law. In :;~~ 
Commercial and Savi1~gs Ba>ck v. T1•,,.·11bo, sz.pra, the defendant 
believing that he had adequately retained counsel to repre-
sent him, left the state and did not become aware of his 
default until three days after entry of judgment. The cour: 
relieved him of his default there, stating, at 1036: 
" •.. courts do not favor judgments by default. 
The policy of the law is that every man shall 
be entered against him and where a judgment 
by default has been entered, and within the 
proper time, a good defense to the action to 
which the judment was rendered is made to 
appear, and it is shown that the default was 
entered through excusable neglect or mistake, 
the default will be vacated, and the judgment 
set aside, to permit a trial on the merits. 
It is true that ordinarily the setting aside 
of a judgment by default rests within the 
sound legal discretion of the court, and the 
appellate court will not interfere, but where, 
as in this case, it is made clearly to appear 
that there was such an abuse of discretion, 
through inadvertence or otherwise, as to rendu 
the action erroneous and unlawful, the appellate 
court will control such discretion, and set 
aside the illegal action." 
h t counse: Since leaving the state in the mistaken belief t a 
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had been retained was held sufficiently excusable in Utah 
commercial Savings Bank v. Trumbo, supra, the mistaken 
belief of the mayor, as nominal head of the defendant-city 
herein, that the summons had been transmitted to the 
defendant's insurer-counsel, is also sufficiently excusable. 
The plaintiff here also did not have the excuse for not 
notifying the defendant of the Motion for Default Judgment 
that the plaintiff in Trumbo, supra, had; the defendant-city 
here did not leave the state. 
Even in Utah Sand and Gravel Products Corporation v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P. 2d 703 (1965), where there 
was a jurisdictionally defective copy of the summons, the 
defendant's counsel at least had notice of the pendency of 
some action. Here the defendant's counsel had no notice 
at all, and thus is completely innocent of even the slightest 
inadvertence. In Utah Sand and Grcvel Products Corporation 
vs. Tolbert, supra, the court stated, at 705: 
"It is in accordance with our rules, and 
our decisional law, that where a default 
has been taken against a party and there 
is any justifiable excuse, the court should 
be indulgent in setting aside the judgment 
to afford him an opportunity for a trial on 
merits, and any doubt about such a matter 
should be resolved in favor of doing so." 
While never having decided a case with facts quite like the 
one at bar, this court should hold, in keeping with the tenor 
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of the above decisions, that a minor, unperceived, inadver-
tent act of a clerical employee is a "justifiable excuse." 
This case is at the other end of the spectrum from 
Airkem Intermountain Inc., v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P. 
429 (1973), wherein this court stated, at 431: 
"The movant must show that he has used 
due diligence and that he was prevented 
from appearing by circumstances over 
which he had no control.·• [emphasis added] 
There, the delay involved was intentional and of seven mont': 
duration. Here, on the other hand, the delay was minimal 
and the "due diligence" of defendant's counsel was adequate. 
Certainly the unwitting misdirection of the summons by a 
clerical employee is one of those foreseeable circumstances 
sufficient to pass the standard of Airkem Intermountain In~ 
v. Parker, supra. 
A holding that the inadvertence here is a "justifiable 
excuse" would be consonant with decisions in other states. 
In Montez v. Tonkawa Village Apart"!ents, 215 Kan. 29, 523 
P. 2d 351 (1974), the Supreme Court of Kansas held that a 
litigant should not be unnecessarily penalized for the 
simple neglect of his agent which results in a default jud;· 
ment. There, the employee of the defendant that received 
service inadvertently misplaced the papers, just as theY 
were misplaced by an employee here. In both cases, the 
J 
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principal was in ignorance of the fact that nothing was 
heing done about the suit. One can easily imagine the de-
fendant herein in surprised dismay, echoing the words of 
the defendant to his attorney in Utah Commerciat and Savings 
Bank v. Trumbo, supra, at 53 P. 1035: "Haven't you been 
attending to that ... case?" In '..'c- ~ez v. ::-:;n:.:a·,;c:;: '1-~:Zage 
Apartments, supra, the court held that the error of the 
employee was "excusable" to the defendant-employer, and, 
therefore, held that the trial court's denial of motion to 
vacate was an abuse of discretion. The court stated, at 
523 P. 2d 356: 
"It may be observed that despite the wording 
of the rule the federal courts will refuse 
relief only where the neglect can be branded 
as "inexcusable." Such terminology is closely 
akin to our own phrase 'reckless indifference.' 
.•. It implies somethin·g more than the uninten-
tional inadvertence or neglect common to all 
who share the ordinary frailties of mankind." 
The latter is all that is involved here. 
A few other cases concerning agents of the defendant 
bear examination here. In 1-fooui, J;;c. v. Ambrose and Rosen-
field and Co., 21 Ariz. App. 565, 521 P. 2d 1143 (1974), the 
first process was served on an agent of the defendant who 
did not inform the defendant or his counsel. Upon the direct 
receipt of a second summons, the counsel immediately responded. 
T~ court there held the neglect to be "excusable," and it 
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reopened the default judgment accordingly. Similarly, ir. 
Marquez v. Rapid Harvest Co., 99 Ariz. 363, 409 P. 2d 28S 
(1965), the receiving agent for the defendant quit within 
a few days after service without forwarding the summons. 
The court there held that the neglect to answer caused by 
that situation was "excusable," especially since the cour: 
noted that no intervening rights had attached in reliana 
upon the judgment. 
The plaintiff herein will suffer no prejudice, either. 
In B.D.M., Inc. v. Sageco, Inc., 529 P. 2d 1147 (Hawaii 
1976), the court held that merely having to prove his case 
in an adversary setting is not an element toward establish;:: 
"prejudice" to the non-defaulting party. Finally, in ere"· I 
v. Caro, 114 CA 2d 35, 249 P. 2d 573 (1952), the defendants 
gave the summons to their insurer, who assigned the case tc 
an adjuster, who merely contacted the plaintiff's attorn~. 
and did nothing to officially answer the complaint. The 
court there held that the default should be set aside. 
Another case concerning an insurance carrier is Phi::: 
v. Findlay, 19 Ariz. App. 348, 507 P. 2d 687 (1973). There 
the insurer was not notified of the service on the defenda:.:· 
insured. The court held that this created excusable neglec: 
. ' !l" 
on the part of the defendant's counsel-insurer, suff1clL· 
to reopen the default judgment against the defendant-insu:i 
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Internal corporate confusion has also been held suffi-
cient excuse for inaction in default. Mead v. Citizen's 
Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 78 Ida. 63, 297 P. 2d 
1042 (1956). Here, as in Mead, the usual processing of 
suit papers became temporarily confused, and thus should be 
excused. 
Similar to Kenned2 v. .:.;21' ,~., ;;1;;;., 218 Kan. 387, 
543 P. 2d 937 (1975), the employee involved here had no 
regular summons processing function. Therefore, as in 
~nnedy v. Meyer Co., Inc., supra, the mishandling of the 
summons ought to be held an excusable neglect. The court 
~Kennedy v. Meyer Co., Inc., supra, also held that defaults 
obtained as a surprise to the defaulting party, such as is 
the case here, ought to be vacated. 
Good faith inaction on the part of the defendant, sin-
cerely believing no further action on his part is required, 
is consistently held to be excusable neglect. Riskin v. 
Towers, 24 Cal. 2d 274, 148 P. 2d 611 (1944); NomelZini 
Construction Co. v. Deane, 160 CA 2d 57, 324 P. 2d 654 (1958); 
Martin v. Rossi, 18 Ariz. App. 212, 501 P. 2d 53 (1972). In 
Mar>tin v. Rossi, supra, the court pointed out that the mis-
take need not be "completely explainable" to constitute 
grounds to reopen a default judgment. Here, the defendant 
obviously believed that no more action was required on its 
part. Moreover, the failure of the summons to reach defendant's 
=Junsel-insurer is not only completely explained, it is com-
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pletely understandable. 
In Singleton v. LePak, 425 P. 2d 974 (Okla. 1967), a 
factor given importance by the court in reopening a defau:-
judgment was that the defendant acted with dispatch to 
correct the error upon its discovery. The defendant here:: 
also acted with utmost dispatch once the omission was un-
covered. 
Thus, by all standards applied by cases in other jum 
dictions similar to the case at bar, the defendant's error 
is an "excusable mistake"; and thus the default judgment 
entered against him should have been vacated. As in Monte: 
Tonkawa Village Apar>tmen ts, supr>a, the denial of defendant'; 
motion to vacate was an abuse of discretion. 
POINT TWO 
EQUITY DICTATES THAT THE PLAINTIFF BE 
REQUIRED TO PROVE THE CASE ON ITS MERITS. 
Although Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
purports to allow a default judgment to be entered in every 
case where a party fails to plead or otherwise defend, it 
is quite evident that this rule has as its primary purpose 
the expeditious disposition of undisputed or stale claims. 
In all reported cases where the failure to plead was based 
' 1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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upon mere mistake or excusable neglect, the courts have 
reinstated the party's right to trial on the merits, unless 
he was grossly negligent and the opposing party was harmed 
or pre]udiced in some manner by the failure to act. 
This court stated in Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. 
at 3 7 9: 
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases 
with dispatch and to move calendars with 
expedition in order to keep them up to date. 
But it is even more important to keep in 
mind that the very reason for the existence 
of courts is to afford disputants an oppor-
tunity to be heard and to do justice between 
them. In conformity with that principle the 
courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default judgments where there 
is any reasonable excuse, unless it will 
result in substantial prejudice or injustice 
to the adverse party." 
The mere necessity to go ahead with proof in an adver-
sary setting is not a prejudice or injustice to the adverse 
party in vacation of a default judgment. B.D.lt. Ina. v. 
Sageco, Ina., supra. 
This interpretation of Rule 55 if exemplified by com-
paring two cases which reached contrasting results. In 
~yhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P. 2d 
951 (1962), the court set aside a default judgment where the 
defendant had employed an attorney two days after the twenty-
day period for filing had passed and then asked leave to file 
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his pleadings. It appears that the original action was 
brought against a financially distressed company which hac 
no adequate or legally acting management. In an effort~ 
protect their rights, certain stockholders of this compan,· 
attempted to form a reorganization committee and hired 
attorneys to accomplish this end. The attorneys asked lea·.·, 
of court to file a late answer but the trial court refused 
to grant the request. On appeal, the Supreme Court set 
aside the default judgment, labeling the default judgment 
a "harsh and oppressive thing." (476 P. 2d 953) Noting 
that the defendant's attorneys moved with dispatch to ~n 
the defaults set aside, the court concluded that the late 
filing was due to excusable neglect. 
In contrast, the case of Master>a v. LeEeuer>, 13 Utahl: 
293, 373 P. 2d 573 (1962), is an illuminating example of wr.; 
Rule 55 is necessary. There the Supreme Court held as prW 
the denial of a motion to set aisde a default judgment on 
the grounds of inadvertence and excusable neglect where the 
attorney representing the plaintiff contacted the defendant: 
attorney several days before the default could be taken and 
called his attention to the fact that a default would be w 
unless an answer was filed. In addition, the plaintiff,~ 
elderly woman, had traveled from Seattle, lvashington, ton: 
for the trial and presented an accounting at the default 
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hearing; independent witnesses had been called; and there 
was a possibility that the passage of time would increase 
the damages. Based upon all of these factors, the court 
concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion. 
In the present case, the facts concerning excusable 
neglect of the defendant are sinilar to ~2~~au u. S~a.~3a.ri 
ci:s.:ii;i"':e C:J.71.ca.ny, 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P. 2d 951 (1962). The 
default was entered within four days after the statutory 
period for filing had passed. Within two weeks of the entry 
of the judgment, defendant's counsel moved to have the judg-
ment set aisde. Thus, the failure to file was totally in-
advertent, and the defendant acted promptly and well within 
the ninety day period allowed under Rule 60(b) to have the 
default judgment set aside. In contrast, there is no evidence 
in the record that the failure to file harmed the plaintiff 
~any manner as illustrated in Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 
2d 293, 373 P. 2d 573 (1962). The plaintiff, a local resi-
dent of the city, was seeking specified and constant damages 
for an alleged prior breach of the city's duty to maintain 
the sewer lines. Furthermore, if plaintiff's counsel had 
notified the city of its failure to timely file an answer, 
this situation could have been easily avoided. Although 
Rule 55 does not require notice to be given after the entry 
of the judgment, fairness and justice dictate that it should 
be given before the default judgment is entered. Reported 
l 
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cases constantly scrutinize the record to determine whethe: 
prior notice was given. (See Security Adjustment Bureau, 
v. West, 20 Utah 2d 292, 437 P. 2d 214 (1968).) 
The purpose of a default judgment is to conclude litic,, 
tion when a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend a:: 
action. It was never meant to be used as a means for pumrl 
ing a party for negligence or inadvertence of the party's 
attorney. McKean v. Mountain View Memo1'ial Estates, Inc., 
17 Utah 2d 323, 411 P. 2d 129 (1966). Nor was it meant to 
be used as a device where the plaintiff could avoid the bur· 
den of proving her claim by resort to a technicality. Just: 
and equity demand that the City be allowed its day in cour: 
The plaintiff will not be disadvantaged by being required 
to prove her case on its merits. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requeste: 
that the decision of the district court denying the settin~ 
aside of the default judgment be reversed and that the pla,:· 
tiff be ordered to proceed to trial on the merits oft~~ 
Respectfully submitted, 
I 
I 
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